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HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.
Introduction
On May 9, 2000, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its
decision in Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton.1 In that case, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant's song, Love is a Wonderful
Thing, infringed its song of the same name.2 Following a trial, the jury
found for the plaintiff.3 The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had
made out a "weak" and "circumstantial" case of copying,' but
nevertheless affirmed the jury's verdict,' finding it plausible that the
defendant had unwittingly copied a song he might have heard two full
6decades prior to composing his song by the same name.
This article discusses the temporal remoteness aspect of
copyright law's subconscious, copying doctrine, a topic that has
largely escaped academic criticism. The subconscious copying
doctrine states that copyright infringement defendants can be held
liable for infringement even if they sincerely believe that they
independently created their work.7 The "temporal remoteness"
aspect of this doctrine is defined as the elapsed time between the
purported access to the plaintiff's work and the creation of the
defendant's work.8 This article is meant to serve as a starting point for
a critical discussion of the subconscious copying doctrine, and
particularly the temporal remoteness aspect of the doctrine.
Part II of this article details, the general framework courts
employ to analyze copyright infringement claims. Part III analyzes
the evolution of the concept from its initial application under
circumstances where the proof of copying was strong and the degree
of temporal remoteness was low to its recent application in the Ninth
Circuit where the proof of copying was weak and the degree of
temporal remoteness was high. The article concludes in Part IV by
summarizing the preceding sections and by positing several rhetorical
questions relating to the theory as well as questions relating to the
future application of the doctrine.
1. 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. Id. at 480-481.
3. Id. at 480.
4. Id. at 486.
5. Id. at 485-86.
6. Id. at 484.
7. See e.g. Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
8. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997 (2d Cir.
1983).
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I
The Copyright Infringement Framework
To prevail on a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must
establish (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) "infringement"
or "copying," i.e., that the defendant copied protected elements of
the plaintiff's work. 9 The second element need not be proven directly;
it may be proven indirectly by proffering circumstantial evidence
sufficient to give rise to an inference of copying.10 Generally, a
plaintiff attempting to prove infringement by way of circumstantial
evidence must show (1) that the defendant had "access" to the
plaintiff's work; and (2) that the two works are "substantially
similar." 1
The first element of the circumstantial case of copying - access -
requires a showing that the defendant had "an opportunity to view or
to copy [the] plaintiff's work.', 12 The "opportunity" must be
something more than a bare possibility of viewing or copying the
plaintiff's work. 3 This burden is generally met either by (1)
establishing a traceable chain of events from the defendant back to
the plaintiff's work; or (2) showing that the plaintiff's work has been
widely disseminated."
The second element - substantial similarity - requires a showing
of both extrinsic and intrinsic similarity. 5 The test for extrinsic
similarity, which often involves analytical dissection of a work by
experts, 6 requires a showing of similarity of concrete components of
a work utilizing objective criteria. 7 If a plaintiff is successful in
9. See e.g. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
10. See e.g. id.
11. See e.g. id.
12. See Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prods, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977).
13. See Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 775 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 698 F.2d 966,
967 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 482 ("Of course, reasonable
opportunity as here used, does not encompass any bare possibility in the sense that
anything is possible. Access may not be inferred through mere speculation or conjecture.
There must be a reasonable possibility of viewing the plaintiff's work - not a bare
possibility.") (quoting with approval, Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright vol. 4, § 13.02[A], 13-19 (1999) [hereinafter Nimmer]).
14. See e.g. Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 482 (citing with approval Nimmer § 13.02[A], at
13-20, 13-21; 2 Paul Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice § 8.3.1.1, at 90-91
(1989)).
15. See e.g. Sid and Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
16. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994).
17. See Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919
F.2d 1353, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1990).
satisfying the extrinsic test, the factfinder must apply the subjective
intrinsic test by asking "whether the ordinary, reasonable person
would find the total concept and feel of the works to be substantially
similar."18
The two components of a circumstantial case of copying -
substantial similarity and access - are "inextricably linked."'9 For
instance, when the degree of proof as to access is high, the "inverse
ratio rule" allows a lower degree of proof of similarity. ° In addition,
some courts may infer copying, even absent any proof of access, if the
plaintiff proves that the works are not merely substantially similar,
but "strikingly" similar.2 It is not necessarily true, however, that,
where the evidence of access is weak, a stronger showing of similarity
is required.22
A plaintiff who has made out a case of infringement, either by
direct proof or circumstantially through proof of access and
substantial similarity, effectively establishes a presumption of
copying.23 This effectively shifts the burden to the defendant to show
that he did not copy the plaintiff's work.24
A defendant may negate an inference of copying by showing that
he or she independently created the allegedly infringing work.25 It is
in this regard that patent law and copyright law critically differ
because, although a patent is infringed even if reproduced
independently, a copyright can only be infringed by copying.2 6 Thus,
18. Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal
quotations omitted).
19. Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 485.
20. See Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218; Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1361-62; Sid and Marty Krofft, 562
F.2d at 1172.
21. See Smith, 84 F.3d at 1220; Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423, 424 n. 2 (9th
Cir. 1987). But see e.g. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that there
must be some evidence "which would establish a reasonable possibility that the
complaining work was available to the alleged infringer" even where the similarities were
striking).
22. See Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 486 ("We have never held, however, that the inverse
ratio rule says a weak showing of access requires a stronger showing of substantial
similarity"). Some commentators have argued that the access prong of a circumstantial
case of copyright infringement is over-emphasized or of little present value. See e.g. E.
Scott Fruehwald, Copyright Infringement of Musical Compositions: A Systematic
Approach, 26 Akron L. Rev. 15, 24-25 (1992) (arguing that access is over-emphasized);
Karen Bevill, Copyright Infringement and Access: Has the Access Requirement Lost Its
Probative Value?, 52 Rutgers L. Rev. 311, 324-33 (1999).
23. See Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 1976).
24. Id.
25. See e.g. id.
26. See Fred Fisher, 298 F. at 147 ("To sustain [an infringement suit], however, more
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as long as the defendant's work originated independently with the
defendant, he or she is not guilty of infringement, even if his or her
work is identical tothe plaintiff's work. 7
II
The Evolution and Application of the Subconscious Copying
Doctrine
A. Genesis - Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham
The subconscious copying concept originated in Fred Fisher, Inc.
v. Dillingham. In that case, the plaintiff had composed a song
entitled Dardanella.2 The verse of this song was accompanied by an
"ostinato," described by the court as a "constantly repeated figure,
which produces the effect of a rolling underphrase for the melody,
something like the beat of a drum or tom-tom, except that it has a
very simply melodic character of its own."3° The court found that the
sequence of notes making up the ostinato had previously existed in
several classical works, but that the sequence had not been used as an
ostinato prior to composition of Dardanella'
Shortly after Dardanella had faded from popularity,32 the
defendant, Jerome Kern, wrote a song entitled Kalua, which was a
song in the light opera "Good Morning, Dearie."33 The plaintiff filed
must appear than the mere similarity or even identity, of the supposed infringement with
the part in question. In this lies one distinction between a patent and a copyright. One
may infringe a patent by the innocent reproduction of the machine patented, but the law
imposes no prohibition upon those who, without copying, independently arrive at the
precise combination of words or notes which have been copyrighted"); Harold Lloyd
Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1933) (quoting Fred Fisher).
27. See Harold Lloyd, 65 F.2d at 4. As discussed supra n. 21, and infra nn. 108-123,
however, this fundamental principle of copyright law is sometimes not applied in practice.
Rather, where the works are "strikingly" similar, copying may be inferred even in the face
of the defendant's sworn testimony that he or she independently created the allegedly
infringing work. This can be the result even where the defendant's assertion of
independent creation is found to be credible, under the theory that the only explanation
for the strikingly similar works is that the defendant must have subconsciously copied
from the plaintiff's work. Still, the idea that independent creation is an absolute defense
persists, at least in theory. Whether that is actually the case is beyond the scope of this
article.
28. 298 F. 145. The assertion that Fred Fisher was the first case to articulate and
apply the doctrine is found in Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 482-83.
29. Fred Fisher, 298 F. at 146.
30. Id. at 146.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 147.
33. Id. at 146.
an infringement action against the defendant, asserting that the
ostinato used to accompany the chorus of Kalua was copied from the
ostinato accompanying the verse of Dardanella.34
Judge Learned Hand found that the plaintiff had propounded
sufficient circumstantial evidence of copying to prove infringement.35
The court found access based on the fact that Dardanella had "gained
an enormous vogue, and was sung or played all over the country,,
36
and that Kern "had necessarily known it, as a musician knew it.
37
With respect to similarity, the court found that the similarity of the
two ostinatoes "amount[ed] to identity."38
In response to Kern's testimony that he had independently
created Kalua, the court found his testimony credible, 39 but gave little
weight to it, finding that Kern had subconsciously copied the
ostinato.4 ° In discussing the idea that the defendant subconsciously
copied from the plaintiff's work, the court stated that:
[e]verything registers somewhere in our memories, and no one can
tell what may evoke it. On the whole, my belief is that, in
composing the accompaniment to the refrain of Kalua, Mr. Kern
must have followed, probably unconsciously, what he had certainly
often heard only a short time before. I cannot really see how else to
account for a similarity, which amounts to identity. So to hold I
need not reject his testimony that he was unaware of such a
borrowing ....
On the issue of infringement this conclusion is enough. The point is
a new one, but I think it is plain. The author's copyright is an
absolute right to prevent others from copying his original
collocation of words or notes, and does not depend upon the
infringer's good faith. Once it appears that another has in fact used
the copyright as the source of his production, he has invaded the
author's rights. It is no excuse that in so doing his memory has
played him a trick.41
Therefore, the court's adoption of the subconscious copying
concept was predicated upon its findings that (1) the fact of access
was certain (the defendant had "certainly often heard" the plaintiff's
work42); (2) the works were practically identical (the similarity of the
34. Id.
35. Id. at 147-48.
36. Id. at 146.




41. Id. at 147-48.
42. Id. at 147.
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two works "amounted to identity"43); and (3) the degree of temporal
remoteness - the time between the access and the subsequent
creation of the infringing work - was low (the defendant had
certainly heard the plaintiff's work "only a short time before"). 4
When faced with Kern's testimony that he had created his song
independently of the plaintiff's work, the court found Kern's
testimony credible, but that Kern was simply incorrect and that he
must have copied the plaintiff's song without realizing it.
41
Accordingly, the plaintiff prevailed on his claim of infringement.
6
B. Application - The First Fifty Years
1. A Woman Scorned
Fred Fisher was the standard for the application of the
subconscious copying doctrine for many years. For instance, in 1936,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied the doctrine under
similar circumstances in the case of Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp.47 Sheldon involved an alleged infringement of the
plaintiff's play, Dishonored Lady, by the defendant's movie, Letty
Lynton.48 Central to the case were the details of a true story and three
works arising out of that story." The plaintiff's play" was inspired by
the true story of Madeleine Smith."' The defendant, which had seen
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 148.
47. 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
48. Id. at 49.
49. Id. at 49-53.
50. See id. at 50-51. In the plaintiff's play, Girl's family has a scandalous past, her
father having shot his wife's lover in the backstory. Girl meets Boyfriend #1, a South
American dancer, and Boyfriend #1 serenades her with "a Gaucho song." Girl then meets
Boyfriend #2, and they become engaged. Boyfriend #1 learns of the engagement and
threatens to expose Girl's past. A fight ensues between Girl and Boyfriend #1. Girl then
obtains a quantity of strychnine, and, feigning affection for Boyfriend #1, poisons him.
Boyfriend #1, upon becoming aware that he has been poisoned, attempts to use the
telephone, but is thwarted by Girl. As Boyfriend #1 dies, Girl "fills his dying ears with her
hatred and disgust." Girl then wipes away her fingerprints but accidentally leaves a
necklace behind. In the climactic scene, the district attorney questions Girl with
Boyfriend #2 and Girl's father in attendance. Girl's denial progressively breaks down
until another former lover of Girl's provides her with an alibi by saying that she was with
him at the time of the murder.
51. See id. at 49-52. In its most pertinent particulars, Smith's story is as follows: Smith
and Boyfriend #1 wrote love letters to each other. After Smith met Boyfriend #2,
Boyfriend #1 threatened to expose Smith by disclosing the letters. Smith then feigned
affection to Boyfriend #1 and invited him to come see her again. Boyfriend #1
the plaintiff's play, asserted that its movie," completed in the spring
of 1932, was based on a book53 inspired by the true story of Madeleine
Smith .
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court,
found that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's work.5 Access
was proven directly, as the testimony showed that the defendant had
not only seen the plaintiff's play, but had also negotiated,
unsuccessfully, with the plaintiff for the movie rights to the play as
late as the spring of 1931.56 With respect to the similarities between
the plaintiff's and defendant's works, the court found that "[t]he
dramatic significance of the scenes we have recited is the same,
almost to the letter.,
57
In response to the proffered testimony of each person involved
in the adaptation of the book for the movie that they had not used
the plaintiff's play in any way, the court did not disbelieve their
testimony but found that the defendant's evidence did not sufficiently
subsequently died of poisoning. Smith was soon thereafter tried for the murder of
Boyfriend #1 and was acquitted based primarily upon an alibi established by her younger
sister and Boyfriend #2.
52. See id. at 52-53. In the defendant's movie, Girl's family has a scandalous past, her
father having been killed by his mistress's husband in the backstory. Girl has previously
attempted without success to break off her affair with Boyfriend #1, a South American.
Girl then meets Boyfriend #2, and they become engaged. Boyfriend #1 learns of the
engagement and confronts Girl. A fight ensues, and Boyfriend #1 threatens to expose Girl
by disclosing love letters the two had written to each other. Girl obtains a quantity of
strychnine and contemplates suicide. Girl goes to visit Boyfriend #1 and a fight ensues.
Boyfriend #1 drinks poisoned wine and then sings "a Gaucho song" to Girl. Upon
becoming aware that he has been poisoned, he attempts to telephone for help, but Girl
prevents him from doing so. "As [Boyfriend #1] slowly dies, she stands over him and
vituperates him." Girl wipes away her fingerprints but accidentally leaves some tangible
evidence behind. In the climactic scene, Girl is questioned by the authorities in the
presence of Boyfriend #2. Her denial progressively breaks down until Boyfriend #2
provides an alibi by saying that Girl spent the night of the murder with him.
53. See id. at 51-52. An author named Lowndes wrote a book based on Smith's story.
In its most general terms, the story according to the book is as follows: Girl meets
Boyfriend #1 and falls in love, keeping the love affair a secret from her parents. Girl
writes love letters to Boyfriend #1, and they become engaged. Girl resists Boyfriend #1's
attempts to persuade Girl to tell her parents of the engagement. Girl then meets
Boyfriend #2 and becomes engaged to him. When Boyfriend #1 learns of Boyfriend #2,
Boyfriend #1 threatens to use the love letters to expose Girl to her parents. Girl then
obtains a quantity of arsenic, intending initially to ingest it herself, but later feigns
affection for Boyfriend #1 and poisons him instead. Girl then separates herself from
Boyfriend #1 and fakes automobile trouble to establish the alibi that prevents her from
being found guilty in the climactic scene.
54. Id. at 52.
55. Id. at 56.
56. Id. at 52.
57. Id. at 56.
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rebut the circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff. 8 With
respect to this finding, the Court stated that
in concluding as we do that the defendants used the play pro tanto,
we need not charge their witnesses with perjury. With so many
sources before them they might quite honestly forget what they
took; nobody knows the origin of his inventions; memory and fancy
merge even in adults. Yet unconscious plagiarism is actionable
quite as much as deliberate."
Thus the subconscious copying doctrine was applied against the
defendant where (1) the fact of access was certain;' (2) the works
were practically identical;6  and (3) the degree of temporal
remoteness was low.
62
2. Geek Wins the Girl and the Game
Though the Second Circuit applied the subconscious copying
doctrine in Sheldon in 1936, most courts considering its application
over the next five decades, found the doctrine to be valid, yet
declined to apply it. The following four cases, covering dates 1933 to
1980, illustrate this reluctance.
In Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer,63 the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants' silent movie, The Freshman, infringed the plaintiff's
story, The Emancipation of Rodney.6 The plaintiff's story, in its most
general terms, is a story of a young man who "goes to college as a
freshman, aspires to be popular, meets a girl, falls in love, [and] wins
a football game and the approval of the girl."' The main character in
the defendants' silent movie "also goes to college as a freshman,
aspires to be popular, plays football, and in the last five minutes of a
big football game is sent on the field by the coach and wins the
game." 66
58. See id. at 52.
59. Id. at 54. The court cited Fred Fisher, Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S.
191, 198, 51 S. Ct. 410 (1931), and Harold Lloyd, 65 F.2d at 1, discussed infra nn. 63-75, in
support of this statement.
60. See supra n. 56 and accompanying text (defendant had negotiated with plaintiff
for the rights to plaintiff's work).
61. See supra n. 57 and accompanying text ("[t]he dramatic significance of the scenes
we have recited is the same, almost to the letter.").
62. See supra nn. 56 (defendant had access to plaintiff's play by virtue of negotiating
with plaintiff for its rights in the spring of 1931) and 52 (defendant completed production
of its movie in March, 1932).
63. 65 F.2d at 1.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3.
The defendants' movie was filmed in 1924.67 The evidence
relating to access showed that the defendants, during or immediately
prior to production, were in fact aware of the general outline of the
plaintiff's work.68 In addition, they had access, at some time prior to
production, to the particulars of the plaintiff's work.69 The proof also
showed, however, that the defendants, while having a reasonable
opportunity to view the particulars of the plaintiff's work, in fact did
not view them.7"
The court conducted an exhaustive analysis relating to the
similarities and dissimilarities of the two works.7" It found the works
to be similar, but insufficiently similar to overcome the defendant's
assertion of independent creation.72 The court thus declined to apply
the subconscious copying doctrine under the given facts,73 i.e., where
(1) the question of access was suspect; 4 (2) the works were only
somewhat similar;75 and (3) the degree of temporal remoteness was
low.76
67. Id. at 2.
68. Id. at 2, 5, 10, 17. Subsequent to the 1915 publication in a magazine of the
plaintiff's story, the plaintiff related, from memory, the general outline of his story to the
defendants. At the same time, however, the plaintiff indicated that he could not clearly
recall the particulars of the story and stated that he would provide the defendants with a
copy of the magazine containing the story. The plaintiff did so deliver the magazine. A
defendant met with the plaintiff again in October, 1924, prior to production of the
defendants' movie. At this time, the magazine containing the particulars of the plaintiff's
story had been misplaced, and the defendant did not learn any more of the particulars
from the plaintiff.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id. Though the magazine was delivered to the defendants, each individual
associated with creation of the defendants' film denied ever reading or hearing the
plaintiff's story except as generally told to them by the plaintiff from the plaintiff's
memory.
71. Id. at 19-22; see also id. at 32-38 (McCormick, J. dissenting).
72. Id. at 28 ("We are of opinion that such similarities as exist between the play and
the story, and there are many, are such as require analysis and critical comparison in
order to manifest themselves. The outstanding feature, the climax of both story and play,
is the football game, with necessarily some similarity, but there is nothing new and novel
in that other than the unusual participation of the heroes in their respective games, and
on analysis these are neither identical nor similar in scene nor in conception of the two
productions, but, if this be doubted, as was done by the trial court, then it is clear that
there is no such similarity as overcomes the positive testimony that there was in fact no
copying").
73. See id.
74. See supra nn. 68-70 and accompanying text (defendants had actual access to the
generalities of the plaintiff's work and did not take advantage of having an opportunity to
view its particulars).
75. See supra nn. 71-72 and accompanying text (works similar, but not substantially
so).
76. See supra nn. 67-70 and accompanying text (defendants were aware of the
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3. All That Jazz
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus,77 involved the
plaintiff's book, Love Girl, and the defendant's movie, Alexander's
Ragtime Band, which is also the title of Irving Berlin's earliest hit
song.8 After Berlin had gained notoriety as a popular composer, the
plaintiff intentionally wrote her book "Berlin-style., 79 The defendant,
desiring to produce a film based on Berlin's life, contacted Berlin
himself, who responded favorably and who was thereafter involved in
the creation of the movie."0 The finished movie's central character
was a fictional composite of several men associated with the rise of
jazz music."1
The trial court analyzed the works and found that there were
similarities between the plaintiff's and defendant's works "which
could not be the result of coincidence and which, therefore, were the
result of access to the book by defendant and of 'conscious or
unconscious' copying thereof."82 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed and found that the defendant did not, consciously or
subconsciously, copy the plaintiff's work.83
The court noted that there was direct evidence that the
defendant did not have access to plaintiff's work.' Regarding the
similarities of the works, the court found that the similar elements
common to both works were matters in the public domain,85 and were
generalities of the plaintiff's work just prior to production in 1924, and had access to its
particulars at some time prior to production but did not avail themselves of the
opportunity to view the particulars).
77. 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1946).
78. Id. at 893, 894.
79. Id. at 900 n. 2.
80. Id. at 894.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 893-894.
83. Id. at 898, 900.
84. Id. at 899 ("[Tlhe fact of non-access has been established by evidence of
witnesses and documents which exclude all reasonable probability of access and leave
only the bare possibility that all the witnesses intentionally swore falsely upon the matter
of access of which they had full knowledge."). The facts pertinent to this conclusion were
that (1) the plaintiff's work was unpublished; (2) each and every employee of the
defendant who had "directional authority over any part of the production" testified that
the film was produced completely in accord with the original concept developed
exclusively by Berlin and the defendant's vice president; and (3) other employees of the
defendant not associated with the production of the film testified as to the defendant's
policy and procedure of not accepting any "literary property from an unknown author like
plaintiff for any purpose except through certain agents on its list of agents" and that the
only two agents with which the plaintiff dealt were not on this list, see id. at 893, 897.
85. Id. at 899.
the natural result of basing a work of fiction on a true story.86 The
court concluded that:
[t]he most that can be claimed for the result of the comparison
between the book and the picture in this case is that it raises a
doubt or suspicion that defendant might have had access. The
suspicion cannot stand against the oaths of the witnesses who know
the facts.,
87
The court accordingly reversed the decision of the trial court and
found for the defendant,8" specifically finding that this was not an
appropriate case in which to invoke the subconscious copying
doctrine in order to find the defendant liable for infringement. 89 Thus,
the court did not apply the doctrine of subconscious copying where
(1) the question of access was affirmatively negated;' and (2) the
works were not substantially similar, except with respect to elements
not protectible by copyright law.9' The degree of temporal
remoteness was immaterial due to the finding that there was in fact
no access.
4. No Man is an Island
In Whitney v. Ross Jungnickel, Inc. ,92 the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant's song No Man is an Island (No Man Can Stand
Alone), written by the defendants in 1953, infringed a song entitled
No Man is an Island which they had written in 1950 and moderately
disseminated in 1951. 93 The phrase "no man is an island" is a quote
from a work by John Donne and prominently appears in Ernest
Hemingway's novel For Whom the Bell Tolls.94
With regard to access, the court found that, for the three years
preceding the composition of the defendant's song, the "plaintiffs'
song made a minor impact at best, had a relatively limited appeal and
circulation, and could not be said to have been widely or generally
86. Id. at 900 n. 2 ("[I]t seems possible that when [Berlin] applied himself for twenty
months with the others to composing the settings for his songs on the historic basis of his
own associations and memories that their version included particulars that had come
within plaintiff's range and so were in her book in some more or less discernible
similarity.").
87. Id. at 899-900.
88. Id. at 900.
89. Id. at 898.
90. Supra n. 84 and accompanying text.
91. Supra nn. 85-87 and accompanying text.
92. 179 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
93. Id. at 752, 754.
94. See id.
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known."95 The composers of the defendant's song denied having
heard the plaintiffs' work, and stated that they composed their song
after contemplating the theme of the first line of the Donne
quotation.96
With respect to similarity, the plaintiffs' claim of infringement
centered only around the first two lines of the lyric of each song, the
first of which was the Donne quotation in the public domain.' With
respect to the remainder of the song, the court stated that "[t]here is
no question but that the music is entirely different from that
composed by plaintiffs, as are the rest of the lyrics.,
98
The court concluded that the defendant's song did not infringe
the plaintiffs' song, stating that
[t]he possibility that [the authors of defendant's song] may have
heard plaintiffs' song at some time over the air cannot be altogether
excluded. But a finding that they had done so and that they had
derived these two lines from plaintiffs' song would be mere
conjecture and speculation wholly unjustified by the evidence here.
Plaintiffs' evidence as to access is wholly insufficient to overcome
[the authors'] direct testimony or to justify the inference that there
was unconscious copying, much less a deliberate attempt at
imitation. 99
Thus, the doctrine was not applied where (1) the question of
access was suspect;'00 (2) the works shared only one line of lyric
eligible for copyright protection in common;"' and (3) the temporal
remoteness was no more than three years."
95. Id. at 754, 752. Among the facts leading to this conclusion are these: the
plaintiffs' song was recorded in February, 1951. Id. By 1953, the year during which the
defendant's song was written, 7500 records, 65,000 copies of a choral arrangement, and
1557 copies of sheet music of the plaintiffs' song were sold. Id. The court found that the
plaintiffs' song was "much more widely performed and successfuly [sic] exploited" after
the defendant's song was written than before it was written. Id.
96. See id. at 753.
97. See id. at 752, 753. The first two lines of the plaintiffs' song were "No man is an
island, No man stands alone." Id. at 752. The first two lines of the defendant's song were
"No man is an island, No man can stand alone." Id.
98. Id. at 752.
99. Id. at 755.
100. See supra nn. 95-96, 99 and accompanying text (plaintiff's song was only
moderately disseminated and the authors of defendant's song affirmatively denied ever
having heard it).
101. See supra nn. 97-98 (works had only two lines of lyric in common, the first being
in the public domain).
102. See supra n. 93 (plaintiffs' song was moderately disseminated beginning in 1951,
no more than three years prior to the composition of defendant's song).
5. Cat Fight
In United Artists Corp. v. Ford Motor Co.,03 the plaintiffs
brought suit alleging that the defendants' commercial featuring "an
animated humanoid feline character," created in 1975, infringed the
plaintiffs copyright in the movies The Pink Panther and The Return of
the Pink Panther1" The defendants conceded that they had access to
the plaintiffs' works,05 since the plaintiff's first and second movies
featuring the character had been widely disseminated in 1964 and
1974 respectively.
116
In discussing similarity, the court found that the works were "not
so substantially similar that an ordinary viewer of defendants'
television commercials would not readily detect the differences
between them.' 1 7 In response to the question of whether the
defendants might have subconsciously copied the plaintiffs' work, the
court rested its conclusion on the quantum of similarity between the
two works, stating that "the resemblances between the two figures
are not of such magnitude as to support the allegation of
subconscious copying."' 108
Thus, the doctrine was not applied where (1) the question of
access was conceded; 1"9 (2) the works were similar, but not
substantially so;"' and (3) the temporal remoteness was as short as
one year.
C. Application - The Last Twenty-five Years
1. If You Think it's Better, but it's not, it's the Chiffons
Though courts were, for the first fifty years after Fred Fisher,
103. 483 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
.104. Id. at 90.
105. Id. at 93.
106. Id. at 90. The opinion states that the second movie was released in 1974 and that
the first movie was released some eleven years prior to the second. The copyright date for
the first movie is 1964.
107. Id. at 95. The court conducted a fairly extensive comparison of the two works.
Some of the similarities and dissimilarities discussed include: (1) Neither cat speaks; (2)
Both cats perform with a voice over; (3) Both cats ambulate with what animators describe
as a "double bounce;" (4) The defendants' cat is much more realistic looking than the
Pink Panther; (5) both cats are stand-up characters with some humanoid features, with
stomachs lighter in color than the rest of the body; and (6) The physique of the
defendants' cat is much more muscular.
108. Id. at 95.
109. See supra n. 105.
110. See supra nn. 107-108.
111. Seesupra nn. 104-106.
[23:457HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
2001] TEMPORAL REMOTENESS ASPECT OF SUBCONSCIOUS COPYING 471
reluctant to apply the subconscious copying doctrine except under
circumstances similar to those in Fred Fisher, two more recent cases
have not only applied the doctrine, but have applied it to situations
where the circumstantial evidence of infringement is much weaker
than it was in either Fred Fisher or Sheldon. 2
In Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., the
plaintiff was the owner of a copyright to the song He's So Fine, which
was written by Ronald Mack and recorded by The Chiffons."3 The
plaintiff alleged that George Harrison's song, My Sweet Lord,
infringed He's So Fine.4 The court found copying based on a strong
inference arising out of wide-dissemination access.. as well as
Harrison's concession that he had heard the plaintiff's work at least a
few times,"6 and that the two works were "strikingly similar.""' 7
The inference so created was strong enough to overcome
Harrison's assertion of independent creation,"8 and the court held
that Harrison had subconsciously infringed the plaintiff's work,
stating that "My Sweet Lord is the very same song as He's So Fine
with different words, and Harrison had access to He's So Fine. This
is, under the law, infringement of copyright, and is no less so even
though subconsciously accomplished.""
9
On appeal, in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.,20
Harrison argued that his case was significantly different from
112. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
113. Id. at 178.
114. Id.
115. Id. He's So Fine was number one on the Billboard Charts in the United States for
five weeks in 1963. On June 1, 1963, the same date the Beatles, a group of which Harrison
was a member, had a number one song on the charts in England, He's So Fine was
number twelve in England. Though it is not discussed at this stage of the case, the
appellate court made reference to Harrison's admission that he had in fact heard He's So
Fine in the early 1960's when it was popular. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs
Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997-998 (2d Cir. 1983).
116. See ABKCO, 722 F.2d at 998.
117. Id. at 180. The court in Bright Tunes found that "the two songs are virtually
identical except for one phrase." 420 F. Supp. at 180. More specifically, the court found
that "[t]here is motif A used four times, followed by motif B, four times in one case, and
three times in the other, with the same grace note in the second repetition of motif B." Id.
The use of the term "striking" to describe the similarities between the two works did not
originate with the trial court in Bright Tunes, but rather with the appellate court on
appeal. ABKCO, 722 F.2d at 998 ("Even Harrison conceded at trial that the two songs
were "strikingly similar" as played by a pianist during the liability trial.").
118. See Bright Tunes, 420 F. Supp. at 179-80.
119. Id. at 180-81.
120. ABKCO, 722 F.2d at 992. In the interim, Bright Tunes had sold the He's So Fine
copyright and Bright Tunes' rights in the litigation to ABKCO Music.
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Sheldon12'and Fisher.2 2 He emphasized that the infringing works in
those two cases were created soon after the infringers had access to
the plaintiffs' works whereas Harrison's access to He's So Fine
occurred approximately six years before he composed My Sweet
Lord. 23 The appellate court declined to give effect to this distinction,
holding that "on the facts presented herein, where the similarity was
so striking and where access was found, the remoteness of that access
provides no basis for reversal.
1 21
Thus, the court applied the doctrine where (1) the fact of access
was shown through proof of wide dissemination;'25 (2) the works were
strikingly similar;' 26 and (3) the temporal remoteness was a fairly long
six-year period of time.'27
2. Haven't I Heard this Before?
The irrelevancy of temporal remoteness was taken to an extreme
in the case of Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton.128 That case involved
two songs, both entitled Love is a Wonderful Thing, one written and
recorded by the Isley Brothers in 1964 and the other written by the
defendants, Michael Bolton and Andrew Goldmark, in 1990 and
recorded by Bolton in 1991.129 After trial, a jury found that the
defendants had infringed the plaintiff's copyright.30 Access was
established based on (1) moderate dissemination of the plaintiff's
song;13 (2) the defendants' testimony relating to their involvement inthe music industry at the time the plaintiff's work was disseminated;' 32
121. See supra nn. 47-62 and accompanying text.
122. See supra nn. 28-46 and accompanying text. The trial court also relied upon
Northern Music Corp. v. Pacemaker Music Co., 147 U.S.P.Q. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), a case
with a holding similar holding to Sheldon, for its decision. Bright Tunes, 420 F. Supp. at
181.
123. ABKCO, 722 F.2d at 997.
124. Id. at 998.
125. Supra n. 115.
126. Supra nn. 116-117,
127. Supra n. 123.
128. 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000).
129. Id. at 480-481.
130. Id. at 480.
131. Id. at 483. The testimony reflected that the plaintiffs' song was disseminated on
radio and television where the defendants grew up. It was played five or six times during a
thirteen-week period on a television show, four times per day during an eight to twenty-
four week period on radio, and twice on another television show. The plaintiffs' song,
however, never made the top 100 on the Billboard Charts. It was not released on an
album until 1991, a year after the defendants composed their song.
132. Id. at 483-84. Bolton testified that he had been listening to rhythm and blues
music since he was ten or eleven years of age and that he was "a huge fan" of the
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and (3) a statement made by Bolton during composition of his and
Goldmark's song, wondering whether they were creating a song that
had already been written."3
With respect to similarity, the evidence showed that the two
songs shared the following elements: (1) the title hook phrase; (2) a
shifted cadence; (3) instrumental figures; (4) a verse/chorus
relationship; and (5) a fade ending.3 Based on this testimony, the
jury found that the songs were substantially similar, and coupled with
its finding of access, rendered a verdict for the plaintiff.35
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit declined to disturb the jury's
findings as to access and substantial similarity and it accordingly
affirmed the jury's verdict. 136 The court seemed troubled by the jury's
verdict, but repeatedly emphasized the standard of review governing
jury verdicts and the wide discretion accorded jury findings. '37 In
response to Bolton's attempt to rebut the inference of copying
through proof of independent creation, the court again emphasized
the standard of review and found in favor of the plaintiff. 8 More
specifically, the court found that "[i]t is entirely plausible that two
Connecticut teenagers obsessed with rhythm and blues music could
remember an Isley Brothers' song that was played on the radio and
television for a few weeks, and subconsciously copy it twenty years
later. 1 39 Still, the court intimated that the result may have been
different had it not been for the standard of review by saying that
plaintiffs. In meeting one of the Isley Brothers later in life, Bolton stated that "I know
this guy. I go back with him. I have all his stuff." One of the Isley Brother's wives stated
that at this meeting Bolton said "I know everything he's done."
133. Id. at 484. Bolton wondered aloud during composition of his song whether he was
copying a Marvin Gaye song entitled Some Kind of Wonderful.
134. Id. at 485.
135. Id. at 480.
136. Id. at 485-486.
137. Id. at 485 ("Although we might not reach the same conclusion as the jury
regarding access, we find that the jury's conclusion about access is supported by
substantial evidence. We are not establishing a new standard for access in copyright cases;
we are merely saying that we will not disturb the jury's factual and credibility
determinations on this issue"); id. at 485-486 ("We refuse to interfere with the jury's
credibility determination, nor do we find that the jury's finding of substantial similarity
was clearly erroneous"); id. at 482 ("We affirm the jury's verdict in this case in light of the
standard of review and copyright law's 'guiding principles.' ... Our decision is predicated
on judicial deference - finding that the law has been properly applied in this case, viewing
the facts most favorably to the appellees, and not substituting our judgment for that of the
jury").
138. Id. at 486 ("Once again, we refuse to disturb the jury's determination about
independent creation. The substantial evidence of copying based on access and
substantial similarity was such that a reasonable juror could reject this defense.").
139. Id. at 484.
"[a]lthough this may be a weak case of access and a circumstantial
case of substantial similarity, neither issue warrants reversal of the
jury's verdict."'' °
Thus, in Three Boys, the doctrine of subconscious copying was
applied to a situation where (1) the question of access was "weak,"
resting upon a mere showing of moderate dissemination; 4' (2) the
jury's finding of substantial similarity was questionable, and only
affirmed due to the substantial discretion accorded jury findings; 12




In summary, when the subconscious copying doctrine was first
articulated and applied in 1924, it was applied under stringent
circumstances, i.e. where there was a low degree of temporal
remoteness and a strong showing of copying.' This remained the
standard for the next 50 years 1 5 until Bright Tunes/ABKCO. In that
case, the temporal remoteness factor was a more moderate six-year
period. Countervailing against this longer temporal remoteness
period, however, was the fact that access was virtually certain and the
fact that the works were not merely substantially similar, but
strikingly similar.46
In Three Boys, however, not only was the temporal remoteness
period more than three times that of Bright Tunes/ABKCO, but the
inference of copying was also weak.1'7 No longer is the doctrine
reserved for instances where access is certain, similarity is substantial,
and temporal remoteness is low, or even to instances where access is
certain, temporal remoteness is moderate, and similarity is striking.
In light of Three Boys, it seems that the mere spark of questionably
substantial similarity between two works may spawn a flame of
inference that a defendant copied a song he might have heard two
decades before, and that that flame may carry the day.
140. Id. at 486.
141. See supra nn. 131-133, 136-140.
142. See supra nn. 134-135, 136-140.
143. Seesupra n. 139.
144. See supra nn. 28-46 and accompanying text (discussing Fred Fisher).
145. See supra nn. 47-111 and accompanying text (discussing Sheldon, Harold Lloyd,
Twentieth-Century Fox, Whitney, and United Artists Corp.).
146. See supra n. 127 and accompanying text (discussing Bright Tunes/ABKCO).
147. See supra nn. 128-143 and accompanying text (discussing Three Boys).
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This situation presents many questions. For instance, what is the
effect of the doctrine as applied in Three Boys on the independent
creation defense? Theoretically, if one independently creates a work,
then the fact that it is similar, or even identical, is irrelevant. But,
under Three Boys, even credible evidence of independent creation
may be disregarded if the works are substantially similar.
Additionally, one might ask whether a work created
independently of one's consciousness is really "copying." Is it sound
to conclude that one has "access" to his or her subconscious? Is
access to a prior work sufficient where that access is long forgotten
and at the time of creation of a new work, inaccessible to the creator?
Other intriguing questions exist as well. What lies in store for the
future? What will be the result of the increased dissemination and
archival of copyrightable works over the Internet? What will be the
result of the barrage of works coupled with advertisements in every
imaginable medium to which the average consumer is, consciously or
otherwise, exposed? If access is so easily proven, and if similarity
alone can negate a credible assertion of independent creation, how is
a defendant to defend?
Just how defenseless does the modern subconscious copying
doctrine render a defendant? Time will tell.
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